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Pursuant to the so-called ‘loyalty to the EU principle’ enshrined in Article 10 EC,
Member States are obliged to remove national barriers to free movement of
capital (Article 63 TFEU). However there are certain national barriers which the
Member States sought to retain in spite of the foresaid obligation. These barriers
are the so-called ‘golden shares’[i]  which allow State to retain control over
former SOE’s. Typically, the special ‘golden’ share (hereafter: GS) aimed to
remain property of State, granting it with special powers and allowing to exercise
control over company’s management which could only be exercised by a majority
shareholder. In order to be acceptable under the then EC law GS had to be justi ed
on grounds of exceptions laid down in the Treaty[ii], meet legal certainty and
proportionality requirement – an imperative that could not be easily satis ed.
The EU Commission has long acknowledged that there is no place for unjusti ed
GS and sued erring Member States in the Court of Justice of European Union
(CJEU). The CJEU has evaluated the legality of GS in  fteen cases and only in one
instance their application has been justi ed.[iii] These condemning judgments
are of declamatory character therefore it is up to the national Government to
choose how to comply.
Compliance obligations stem from the CJEU’s judgments – depending on the
wording of the operative part and summary the State’s Government could employ
di erent compliance strategies. Firstly, the Member State could repeal GS, thus
entirely eliminating the infringement of the Treaty. Compliance by repeal could
be seen as acting in line with the sincere co-operation principle as it eliminates
the breach of the Treaty in its entirety and therefore e ectively complies with the
judgment. Secondly, the Member State could attempt to meet the justi cation
criteria so that overruled GS could pass the justi cation test. Since passing the
justifying GS is a challenging task, in practice the Commission was never satis ed
with ‘compliance by amendments’. Following such amendments GS retained
their dissuasive powers for foreign investors and subsequently impeded capital
movements. As a result, any justi cation attempts of overruled GS inevitably
triggers further infringement proceedings on amended GS or even sparks further
infringement procedure for non-compliance with the original judgment.
Therefore, any ‘compliance by amendment’ could be seen as acting contrary to
the sincere co-operation principle under Article 10 EC. The above  nding has
been tested by analysis of Italian cases[iv] which revealed that GS are of obstinate
character and governments could be reluctant to repeal them while tampering
with the justi cation test instead.
Generally GS judgments clearly established which provisions were illegal leaving
the Member State with indication as to which GS have to be repealed or amended.
However, as the following analysis will show, sometimes the Member States are
left with a GS ruling with a seemingly dubious compliance obligations stemming
from it. Such was the case with the CJEU’s landmark ruling on C-112/05
Commission v Germany[v] which is one of the most famous and longest-running
cases in Community history. In this case the Commission challenged one of the
oldest instances of GS, the so-called ‘Volkswagen Law’ (the Law) implemented in
1960’s exclusively for the automobile company Volkswagen. It must be stressed,
that the Law di ers considerably from other GS in other States in one respect: it
did not reserve special powers for the sole bene t of the Member State per se but
rather used provisions of national company law to treat State authorities as
ordinary private shareholder.
The Law created a legal framework which indirectly bene ted the State of Lower
Saxony – major shareholder with 20% stake. The Law limited the voting rights
for all shareholders to 20% of the total share capital, while at the same time
increased the majority required for approval of resolutions by general
shareholder meeting from 75% to 80%. The set percentage thresholds were by no
means accidental, but rather aimed to correspond with Lower Saxony’s stake in
Volkswagen The combination of the ownership ceiling and increased majority
provision allowed for Lower Saxony to exercise control over Volkswagen that
would normally be available only to a shareholder owning 25% of the shares. 
 Additionally, the Law allowed for Lower Saxony to appoint two directors to the
company’s supervisory board for as long as it retains any shares in the company,
thus explicably granting the authorities with special power to assign directors.
However, neither increased majority, nor voting right ceiling referred to Lower
Saxony as a sole bene ciary of the Law. In the strictest sense any other
shareholder owning 20% of Volkswagen’s shares could bene t from these
provisions. However, it is clear that the Law was created for the sole bene t of
Lower Saxony – the 20% minority stakeholder.
In spite of the fact that the Commission asserted that all three paragraphs of the
Law infringe the Treaty individually, both Advocate General and the CJEU
analysed the increased majority and the voting right ceiling together in order to
assess their combined deterring e ect on capital movements.[vi] At the joint
examination of cumulative e ects of the Law the Court went on to link the e ects
of the increased majority and the voting right ceiling, stating that provisions
supplemented each other, creating a legal framework which enabled Lower
Saxony to exercise considerable in uence on the basis of its investment.[vii] The
Court came to the conclusion that the combination of the foresaid provisions
constitutes a restriction on the movement of capital.[viii] The Court ruled that by
maintaining in force provision on directors’ appointments, as well as voting right
ceiling in conjunction with increased majority provision, Germany has failed to
ful l its obligations under Article 63 TFEU.
Germany had to comply with the judgment by choosing its compliance strategy –
to repeal or amend the Law. While choosing the strategy the Government referred
to the judgment and proceeded with amending the Law by removing some
overruled provisions.[ix] In the Government’s view the judgment anticipated two
necessary amendments: to the director’s appointment right and the deterring
system. The Government concluded that since the interplay or interaction between
the two provisions of the Law infringes the Treaty, by removing only one
component of the system the interaction between the two provisions will be
eliminated e ectively terminating GS so there would be no necessity to repeal the
remaining provision. Therefore, the compliance strategy anticipated amendment
to the Law by repealing the voting right ceiling (which was also contrary to
German law on stock companies) and provision on director’s appointments, yet
the increased majority provision remained in force. Subsequently, the
Government choose to follow the wording of the ruling without going further
than strictly necessary. E ectively, Germany has complied with the judgment
while at the same time Lower Saxony’s 20% stake allowed it to continue its
in uence over Volkswagen.
Commission was not satis ed with such compliance strategy and threatened to
sue Germany for non-compliance with the original GS ruling under Article 260
TFEU. Germany defended its compliance strategy emphasising that it had no
obligations to amend overruled Law beyond the requirements of the judgment.
Germany insisted that the judgment required for abolition of the legal framework
and subsequent amendment met that requirement. Commission pushed for
removal of increased majority provision, but Germany resisted.
The ambiguity of compliance obligations stemming from Commission v Germany
has been further deepened by judgment of District Court of Hannover[x]. The
District Court assessed the wording of the CJEU’s judgement and concluded that
neither the increased majority provision nor the voting rights ceiling is contrary
to the Treaty per ce.  According to the District Court only the joint e ect of the
said provisions constitutes the breach of the Treaty.  However, in spite of the
District Court’s  nding, the EU Commission urged Germany to repeal the
remaining provision of the Law in order to fully comply with ruling on C-112/05.
Germany, on the other hand, sought to convince the Commission that such
interpretation of compliance obligations stemming from the said judgement is
erroneous. Germany insisted that repealing one of the two provisions of the Law
is su cient to facilitate full compliance. The government proposed to submit a
joint application for interpretation of the CJEU’s judgment in order to resolve the
di ering views on compliance obligations.  Yet the Commission declined
Germany’s o er stating that there are “no doubts as to the meaning or scope of
the 2007 Judgment”.[xiii]
The above interpretative challenges led the Commission to refer the matter to the
CJEU in 2012 under Article 260 TFEU suing Germany for non-compliance with
judgment on C-112/05, stating that it is apparent that each of the three contested
provisions of the Law infringed Article 63 TFEU individually. The resulting
judgment on C-95/12 Commission v Germany, delivered on 22 October 2013 was
the  rst of its kind in the existing body of GS case law since no other Member
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State had to such great extent resisted the Commission’s views on necessary
compliance obligations. In C-95/12 the CJEU ruled that the Commission’s
complaints should be dismissed. Such an outcome of the judicial proceedings
could be seen as a surprise for some, yet for others, it would appear to be
anything but a surprise.
First, even though the judgment on C-112/05 could be seen as missing the
opportunity to outlaw the increased majority provision of the Law, the judgment
on C-95/12 merely concerns the alleged non-compliance with the GS ruling and
not the potential illegality of the foresaid provision. In C-95/12 the Court has
evaluated German compliance strategy and came to a conclusion that it has fully
complied by removing one of the two provisions which constituted an illegal
system. The outcome of C-95/12 also appears unsurprising once the ruling by the
District Court of Hannover is taken into account. The District Court has rightfully
observed that the CJEU has evaluated the two provisions of the Law as two pieces
of one whole therefore removing one part of the system would result in its
ine ectiveness. Lastly, the outcome of the case C-95/12 has been predicted by
Advocate General when he concluded that the judgment on C-112/05 is not
“particularly ambiguous” and it is “regrettable” that the parties had contrasting
views on its interpretation and could not agree on the necessary compliance
measures.[xiv] Advocate General’s opinion has predicted doom for the
Commission’s claims, con rming that in order to determine the necessary
compliance strategy Germany had to refer to the operative part of the judgment
and not to the broad interpretation of assumed illegality of all three provisions of
the Law as suggested by the Commission.[xv]
Even though the outcome of the judgment C-95/12 could have been predicted, it
should be emphasised that the increased majority provision of the Law could once
again become subject to further judicial review. The retained provision of the Law
has the potential for being in breach of free movement of capital. However, the
Commission would have to initiate a separate infringement procedure to prove
that. The above analysis of German compliance strategy demonstrates the
inherent obstinacy of GS. If, in line with the sincere co-operation principle,
Germany would have opted to repeal all the contested provisions, there would not
be any interpretational issues of the judgment and the increased majority
provision would not retain the potential for being taken to the CJEU on separate
proceedings in the future. This analysis once again demonstrates that when it
comes to compliance with GS judgments, the best possible compliance scenario
would be repealing GS altogether rather than amending them. The controversy of
the Court’s judgment on C-112/05 is likely to re-appear in the future if the
Commission would choose to refer the matter to the Court. The extent to which
Germany’s compliance with the ruling could be seen as acting in line with
‘sincere co-operation’ principle under Article 10 EC could also be questioned,
especially if legality of the retained provision would be tested by the Court.
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